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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating indivisible ob-
jects to a set of rational agents where each agent’s
final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the
allocated item as well as the allocation within the
agent’s local neighbourhood. We specify agents’
local neighbourhood in terms of a weighted graph.
This extends the model of one-sided markets to
incorporate neighbourhood externalities. We con-
sider the solution concept of stability and show that,
unlike in the case of one-sided markets, stable allo-
cations may not always exist. When the underly-
ing local neighbourhood graph is symmetric, a 2-
stable allocation is guaranteed to exist and any de-
centralised mechanismwhere pairs of rational play-
ers agree to exchange objects terminates in such an
allocation. We show that computing a 2-stable al-
location is PLS-complete and further identify sub-
classes which are tractable. In the case of asym-
metric neighbourhood structures, we show that it is
NP-complete to check if a 2-stable allocation ex-
ists. We then identify structural restrictions where
stable allocations always exist and can be computed
efficiently. Finally, we study the notion of envy-
freeness in this framework.
1 Introduction
Allocation of indivisible items to rational agents is a cen-
tral problem which has been studied in economics and com-
puter science. The problem arises in a wide range of appli-
cations: including resource allocation in distributed systems,
spectrum allocation, kidney exchange programs and so on.
Stability and fairness are two influential concepts which are
studied in the context of allocation problems. Various notions
of fairness such as proportionality, envy-freeness and max-
imin share guarantee [Budish, 2011] have been studied in the
general setting of resource allocation [Bouveret et al., 2016;
Beynier et al., 2018]. On the other hand, stability as a solu-
tion concept has received greater attention in the context of
matchings [Gusfield and Irvin, 1989; Roth and Vate, 1990].
In this paper, we introduce a model which is closely
aligned to the one-sided market, also known as the Shapley-
Scarf housing market [Shapley and Scarf, 1974]. This is a
fundamental and well studied framework used to model an
exchange economy. It consists of a set of rational agents each
owning a house along with a strict preference ordering over
all the houses present in the market. A stable allocation cor-
responds to an assignment of houses to agents such that no
coalition of agents can improve by internal redistribution. An
important question is whether stable allocations always exist
in such markets and whether a finite sequence of exchanges
can converge to such an allocation. It was shown that using
a simple and efficient procedure often termed as Gale’s Top
Trading Cycle, one can always find an allocation that is sta-
ble. The allocation constructed in this manner also satisfies
various desirable properties like it being strategy-proof and
Pareto optimal.
In one-sided markets, agents’ preferences are typically as-
sumed to be strict and are not dependent on the allocation
received by other agents. However, in many practical situa-
tions, an agent’s utility for an allocation is dependent on both
their intrinsic valuation for the allocated item as well as the
items which are allocated to the agents within their neigh-
bourhood. We consider a framework to model the alloca-
tion problem where agents have cardinal utilities associated
with each allocation. The agents are not allowed to make
monetary payments to each other, thus the utilities are non-
transferable. For each agent i, the final utility depends on two
components: the intrinsic value associated with the item as-
signed to agent i and the items assigned to the agents within
the neighbourhood of agent i. We model the agents’ neigh-
bourhood structure as a directed weighted graph in which the
nodes correspond to agents. For each agent, the incoming
edges along with the associated weights denote the quanti-
tative “influence” that neighbours have on the agent. In our
model, this influence is also item specific. That is, each item
a is associated with a subset of compatible items aλ. The
externality for an agent who is allocated an item a depends
on the influence from agents in its neighbourhood who are
assigned items from aλ.
Such a framework naturally captures various instances of
allocation problems that arise in practice. For instance, con-
sider a housing allocation problem, where agents have some
intrinsic valuation over the houses. In addition, suppose some
of these agents are friends and would prefer to reside in
houses near each other. In such a scenario, the final util-
ity associated with an allocation depends on both the valu-
ation of the house as well as the owners of the neighbouring
houses. Similarly, consider an organization which needs to
decide project allocation for its incoming employees, with
each project being mentored by senior employees. An em-
ployee’s preference for a project would rely on both, the na-
ture of the project and the mentors assigned for the project.
Certain structural aspects are explicated in the model and
these choices are influenced by the various frameworks of-
ten used to analyse strategic interaction. For instance, graph-
ical dependency structures are known to play an impor-
tant role in the analysis of strategic interaction in terms of
the existence of stable outcomes and their computational
properties. In game theory, such structures are studied in
graphical games [Kearns et al., 2001]. While we do incor-
porate neighbourhood externalities in our model, these are
required to satisfy a pairwise seperability constraint which
specifies the influence of each agent in the neighbourhood.
The eventual externality is additive over these pairwise val-
ues. In game theory, a similar constraint on the utility
functions give rise to a well studied class of games called
polymatrix games [Janovskaya, 1968]. Imposing pairwise
separability is a natural restriction which typically helps
achieve better computational properties and also helps in
showing stronger lower bounds [Cai and Daskalakis, 2011;
Deligkas et al., 2014; Rahn and Scha¨fer, 2015].
Markets form a fundamental model of exchange econ-
omy and allocations of indivisible items in such mar-
kets have been studied extensively both in terms of sta-
bility and fairness of allocation. In the context of
two sided markets, the influence of neighbourhood rela-
tions has been studied in [Arcaute and Vassilvitskii, 2009;
Hoefer, 2013].[Hoefer, 2013] proposes a framework where
players are modelled as nodes in a social network and ex-
plore possible matches only among the players in the cur-
rent neighbourhood. [Arcaute and Vassilvitskii, 2009] mod-
els a job market as a 2-sided matching market and studies
the importance of social contacts in terms of stable alloca-
tion. [Anshelevich et al., 2013] studies stable matchings in
the presence of social contexts where players are positioned
in an underlying weighted directed graph and the weights on
the edges denote the rewards for being matched to each agent.
Each agent’s final utility for a matching depends on both the
agent’s individual reward as well as the rewards received by
the neighbours under the matching.
For one-sided markets, [Bouveret et al., 2017] introduces
a framework that models constraints based on the depen-
dency relation between items with additive utility functions.
The dependency is encoded as a graph on the item set and
an allocation is required to satisfy the constraint that the
items allocated to each agent forms a sub-graph of the item
graph. The paper looks at additive utility functions and in-
vestigates the complexity of finding optimal allocations in
terms of fairness, envy-freeness and maximin share guaran-
tee. [Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018] further studies the com-
putational properties of this model for maximin share alloca-
tions in the specific case when the item graph forms a cycle.
Approximations of envy-freeness in terms of EF-1 is consid-
ered in [Bilo` et al., 2018]. [Chevaleyre et al., 2017] studies
convergence properties for fair allocation of dynamics involv-
ing exchange of items by rational agents in the presence of a
social network structure on the players. In this line of work
listed above, fairness is the main solution concept that is stud-
ied. In our model, rather than viewing the social network
structure as imposing restrictions on the set of feasible allo-
cations, we interpret the neighbourhood structure as specify-
ing agents’ externalities which eventually contributes towards
the final utility. In such a setting, the dynamics involving ex-
change of items are quite natural and therefore, stability of an
allocation is an important consideration that we study.
Decentralised swap dynamics where pairs of agents ex-
change items or services and the optimality of allocations
is studied in [Damamme et al., 2015]. [Gourves et al., 2017]
examines the influence of a social network structure on play-
ers in terms of these exchanges and optimal allocations.
[Sun et al., 2015; Fujita et al., 2015] look at unrestricted ex-
change dynamics in the context of lexicographic preference
ordering, with [Sun et al., 2015] focussing on player prefer-
ences which have a common structure, implying an asymme-
try in the objects. As part of our work, we consider such swap
dynamics in the context of a neighbourhood structure which
influences a player’s utility.
The presence of externalities has been studied in the lit-
erature, mainly in the context of fair and efficient alloca-
tions. [Branzei et al., 2013] studies the problem of fair di-
vision of divisible heterogeneous resources in the presence of
externalities; where the agent’s utility depends on the alloca-
tion to others. A recent paper [Ghodsi et al., 2018] consid-
ers a model similar to the one we study in which they anal-
yse fair allocation in terms of the maximin share guarantee.
[Lesca and Todo, 2018] incorporates a restricted notion of ex-
ternality in the context of a service exchange model and anal-
yses the complexity of computing efficient allocation.
Another related line of work involves agent based mod-
elling of Schelling segregation. [Chauhan et al., 2018] pro-
posed a game theoretic framework to analyse Schelling seg-
regation in which players are partitioned into two types and
are assigned nodes in an underlying graph. Each agent’s
utility depends on the number of neighbours of same type
and the possibility of the agent having a favourite node in
the graph. [Elkind et al., 2019] studies the existence of Nash
equilibrium in an extension of this model with arbitrary types
of agents where agents’ unilateral deviation involve changing
their location to an unoccupied node in the underlying graph.
The notion of swap stability for Schelling segregation, which
is closer to the notion of stability that we study in this paper,
is considered in [Agarwal et al., 2019]. While the framework
is related, the results are not directly applicable in the setting
of one-sided markets.
2 The Model
We introduce the resource allocation problem that we study
in this paper which we call the graphical matching problem.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents (or players)
and A be a finite set of items such that |N | = |A|. The lo-
cal neighbourhood structure for the set of agents, referred to
as the player graph is given by a weighted directed graph
G = (N, τ, w) where τ ⊆ N × N and w is a function that
associates with each edge (i, j) ∈ τ , a weight wi,j ∈ R. We
say that the player graph G is symmetric if for each pair of
players i, j, (i, j) ∈ τ implies (j, i) ∈ τ and wi,j = wj,i. We
say that the player graphG is unweighted if for all (i, j) ∈ τ ,
wi,j = 1.
The dependency structure associated with the items, also
referred to as the item graph, is specified by an undirected
graph H = (A, λ) where λ ⊆ A × A. We assume that both
G and H do not have self loops. For a player i ∈ N , let
iτ = {j | (j, i) ∈ τ} denote the set of all neighbours of i in
G. For an item a ∈ A, let aλ = {b | (a, b) ∈ λ} denote the
set of all items connected to a according to the dependence
structureH .
Each player has a valuation function vi : A → R≥0 that
specifies the initial utility that the player associates with each
item. An allocation pi : N → A is a bijection that assigns
items to players. In other words, an allocation pi assigns ex-
actly one item to each player. Let Π denote the set of all
allocations. For a player i ∈ N and an allocation pi ∈ Π,
let N(i, pi) = {j ∈ N | pi(j) ∈ (pi(i))λ}. For i, j ∈ N ,
we say that i is connected to j in pi if j ∈ N(i, pi). Let
di(pi) = N(i, pi) ∩ iτ . The utility of player i for alloca-
tion pi is then given by: ui(pi) = vi(pi(i)) + ri(pi) where
ri(pi) = Σj∈di(pi)wj,i. In other words, the utility of player
i on an allocation pi depends on his valuation for pi(i) as
well as the agents that are assigned items in the local neigh-
bourhood of pi(i) (N(i, pi)). To simplify notation, we of-
ten use vi(pi) to denote vi(pi(i)). The social welfare for
an allocation pi is defined as SW (pi) = Σi∈Nui(pi). We
say that the graphical matching problem has uniform valu-
ation if for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A, vi(a) = c for some
constant c. In this case, the utilities of players are deter-
mined solely by their local neighbourhood structure. An
instance of the graphical matching problem is specified by
the tuple M = (G,H, (vi)i∈N ) where G = (N, τ, w) and
H = (A, λ). We say thatM = (G,H, (vi)i∈N ) has symmet-
ric neighbourhood if G is symmetric. M is unweighted if G
is unweighted.
Stability in an allocation captures the property that players
do not have any incentive to exchange goods and deviate to
a new allocation. Given an allocation pi, we call a pair of
players i, j ∈ N to be a blocking pair in pi, if there exists
another allocation pi′ where pi′(i) = pi(j), pi′(j) = pi(i) and
pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ∈ N−{i, j} such that ui(pi) < ui(pi
′)
and uj(pi) < uj(pi
′). In other words, the players i, j have an
incentive to deviate from the current allocation by exchanging
their items. We say an allocation pi is 2-stable if there is no
blocking pair in pi.
Given an allocation pi along with a blocking pair (i, j), we
say that pi′ is a resolution of the blocking pair if pi′(i) = pi(j)
and pi′(j) = pi(i). We denote this by pi →i,j pi′. An improve-
ment path is a maximal sequence of allocations pi0pi1pi2 . . .
such that for all k ≥ 1, pik−1 →i,j pik for some pair of play-
ers i, j ∈ N . It is easy to observe that the existence of a finite
improvement path implies the existence of a 2-stable alloca-
tion.
For an allocation pi, we call X ⊆ N a blocking coalition,
if there exists pi′ and a bijection µ : X → X such that for all
i ∈ X , pi′(i) 6= pi(i), pi′(i) = pi(µ(i)) and ui(pi′) > ui(pi).
A
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Figure 1: An item graph
We say an allocation pi is core stable if there is no blocking
coalition in pi.
Example 1. Let the set of players N = {1, . . . , 6} and
A = {A,B,C,D,E, F} with vi(a) = 0 for all i ∈ N
and a ∈ A. Let G = (N, τ, w) be defined as follows:
τ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 2), (6, 3)} and wi,j = 1
for all (i, j) ∈ τ . Let the item graph be the structure given in
Figure 1. Consider the allocation pi where pi(1) = A, pi(2) =
B, pi(3) = C and pi(4) = D, pi(5) = E, pi(6) = F , then
u1(pi) = u2(pi) = u3(pi) = 1 and u4(pi) = u5(pi) =
u6(pi) = 0. Now suppose the pair (1, 4) exchanges items
and let pi′ be the resulting allocation. That is, pi′(4) = A and
pi′(1) = D. Then, u1(pi
′) = 0.
The classical one-sided matching market can be viewed as
a special case of the model given above. Consider an instance
of the one-sided market consisting of two finite setsX and Y
where |X | = |Y |. Each x ∈ X has a valuation function
zx : Y → R which specifies the preference ordering over
outcomes in Y . An allocation pi is a bijection pi : X → Y .
The notion of a 2-stable and core-stable allocation remains
the same as defined earlier; we view the valuation function
zx as specifying the final utility of player x ∈ X . Given
an instance M of a one-sided market, we can construct an
instanceM ′ of the graphical matching problem such that the
set of stable allocations in M precisely constitutes the set of
stable allocations in M ′. We take N = X , A = Y and
vi(pi(i)) = zi(pi(i)) with the player graph G = (N, τ, w)
where τ = ∅.
In one-sided markets, a 2-stable allocation always exists
and it can be computed using the Top Trading Cycle proce-
dure. On the other hand, the presence of neighbourhood ex-
ternalities results in dynamics that is more complex and sig-
nificantly different in terms of players’ behavioural aspects.
The example given below shows that in the graphical match-
ing problem, a 2-stable outcome need not always exist even in
the simple case when the instance has uniform valuation and
when the underlying neighbourhood structure is unweighted.
Example 2. Let the set of players N = {1, . . . , 6} and
A = {A,B,C,D,E, F}. Suppose the player graph G =
(N, τ, w) forms a cycle onN consisting of the edges (6, 1) ∈
τ and (i, i + 1) ∈ τ for all i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. For every edge
(i, j) ∈ τ , let wi,j = c for some positive constant c. We
also assume uniform valuation vi(a) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
a ∈ A. Let the item graph be the structure given in Figure 1.
Since the item graph consists of two 3-cliques, it is sufficient
to divide players into groups of 3, assign them to any of the
3-cliques. It can be verified that this instance does not have a
2-stable allocation.
3 Stability in Symmetric Neighbourhood
Given Example 2, a natural question is to identify restricted
classes of the graphical matching problem where stable out-
comes are guaranteed to exist. We show that when the under-
lying player graph is symmetric, a 2-stable outcome always
exists. In general, it is PLS-hard to compute such a stable
allocation. We also identify restrictions under which stable
allocations can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 1. Every improvement path in a symmetric graph-
ical matching problem is finite. Thus, a 2-stable allocation
always exists.
Proof sketch. We can argue that the following function acts
as a potential function. φ(pi) =
∑
i∈N (vi(pi) + ui(pi)).
Corollary 1. In a symmetric graphical matching problem
with uniform valuation where the underlying player graph is
unweighted, we can compute a 2-stable allocation in polyno-
mial time.
Proof sketch. Suppose vi(a) = c for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A.
Then, φ is bounded above by 2nc + 2|τ | and below by 2nc;
in each resolution step the value increases by at least 2.
If we consider the player graph to have weighted edges,
then computing a 2-stable outcome is PLS-complete already
for the symmetric graphical matching problem with uniform
valuation and non-negative edge weights.
Theorem 2. Finding a 2-stable allocation in a symmetric
graphical matching problem with uniform valuation in which
the edge weights in the underlying player graph are non-
negative is PLS-complete.
Proof sketch. Without loss of generality we assume that
vi(a) = 0 for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A. The potential
function defined in the proof of Theorem 1 essentially re-
duces to the social welfare, i.e., φ(pi) = Σi∈Nui(pi) =
SW (pi). It can be verified that computing a 2-stable allo-
cation is in PLS. To show PLS-hardness, we give a tight re-
duction from the max-cut problem with FLIP neighbourhood
[Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991].
Let Q = (V,E, {ze}e∈E) be an instance of the max-cut
problem where V is the set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is the
set of edges and {ze}e∈E is the set of non-negative edge
weights. We construct an instance of the symmetric graphical
matching problem in which the underlying player graph has
non-negative edge weights as follows. Let the player graph
G = (N, τ), where N = {vblue | v ∈ V } ∪ {vred | v ∈ V }.
That is, for every vertex v ∈ V , there are two vertices
vblue and vred in N . Thus |N | = 2 ∗ |V |. For each edge
(u, v) ∈ E we add two edges in τ : (ublue , vblue) ∈ τ and
(ured , vred) ∈ τ with wublue ,vblue = wured ,vred = z(u,v). Let
wmax = |N |2 ∗ (maxe∈E ze−mine∈E ze). For every v ∈ V ,
we also add the edge (vblue , vred) ∈ τ with wvblue ,vred =
wmax . The item graph is the complete bipartite graph H =
(A, λ) where each partition consists of |V | vertices. In other
words, let the two partitions be A1 and A2, with vertices
A1(1), A1(2), . . . , A1(|V |) andA2(1), A2(2), . . . , A2(|V |)).
For an arbitrary cut (V1, V1), we can construct an allocation
pi such that SW (pi) = 4∗ cutWeight(V1, V1)+2|V | ∗wmax,
that proves the result.
Since Theorem 2 gives a tight PLS reduction from the max-
cut problem, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The standard local search algorithm takes ex-
ponential time in the worst case for the symmetric graphical
matching problem.
The above result shows that in symmetric graphical match-
ing problems with uniform valuations, while a potential func-
tion exists, the bound on the function can be exponential in
the encoding of the instance. A natural question is to ask if
the utilities can be replaced by some bounded integer function
for which the local search has the exact same behaviour. We
now show that when the degree of the player graph is bounded
by two, this is indeed possible, resulting in a polynomial time
procedure.
Theorem 3. For the symmetric graphical matching problem
with uniform valuation, if the underlying player graph has
vertices of degree at most two, a 2-stable allocation can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof sketch. Let ci,1 = maxj∈iτ |wj,i| with ci,2 =
minj∈iτ |wj,i| if |iτ | = 2 and ci,2 = 0 otherwise (∀i ∈
N ). Let g : N → N denote an ordering of the players
(where g(i) denotes the rank of i ∈ N in this ordering)
which satisfies the following condition: if g(i) < g(j) then
ci,1 ≥ cj,1. For i ∈ N , let umini = minpi∈Π ui(pi) and
Yi = {umini , u
min
i + ci,2, u
min
i + ci,1, u
min
i + ci,1 + ci,2}.
Note that, for all pi ∈ Π, ui(pi) ∈ Yi. For x ∈ Yi, let
fi(x) =


0 if x = umini
1 if x = umini + ci,2(ci,2 ≤ ci,1)
2 if x = umini + ci,1 and ci,1 > ci,2
3 if x = umini + ci,1 + ci,2 and ci,2 > 0
It can be shown that P (pi) =
∑
i∈N (2n− g(i))fi(ui(pi)) is a
potential function with an upper bound of 6n2 and a step size
of at least 1 ensuring computation in polynomial time.
The above result implies efficient computation for various
classes of graphs which are often studied, for instance, simple
cycles. One natural question is whether the result can be ex-
tended to structures with small (logarithmic) neighbourhood.
Such a restriction on the neighbourhood graph has interest-
ing consequences in various classes of strategic form games
where equilibrium computation is generally known to be hard
[Gottlob et al., 2005]. We now show that for bounded degree
graphs the problem remains PLS-complete.
Theorem 4. Finding a 2-stable allocation in a symmetric
graphical matching problem with uniform valuation in which
the underlying player graph has vertices with degree at most
six is PLS-complete.
Proof sketch. [Elsa¨sser and Tscheuschner, 2011] showed
that finding a local max-cut with a FLIP neighbourhood
is PLS-complete even for graphs with degree at most five.
Since our reduction in Theorem 2 increases the degree of
each vertex by at most one, the result follows.
While in the analysis above, we consider restrictions on
the player graph, it is also natural to study restrictions on the
item graph. A starting point would be to consider the case
when the item graph is a complete graph. It can be verified
that in this situation, the externalities do not play a crucial
role and a core stable allocation can be computed using the
TTC algorithm. A similar observation holds when the edge
set in the item graph is empty (λ = ∅). Another candidate
restriction would be the bipartite graph. However, our PLS-
hardness reduction in Theorem 2 constructs a complete bipar-
tite item graph. A careful analysis of the potential function in
the context of complete bipartite item graphs provides an up-
per bound in terms of the size of the partition.
Theorem 5. For the symmetric graphical matching problem,
if the underlying item graph is a complete bipartite graph
H = (U, V, U × V ) with U and V being the 2 partitions, a
2-stable allocation can be computed in O(nmin(|U|,|V |)+4).
Proof sketch. Let NU = {i | pi(i) ∈ U} and NV = {i |
pi(i) ∈ V }. Then the potential function reduces to φ(pi) =∑
i∈NU
2ui(pi) +
∑
i∈NV
2vi(pi). Assume |U | ≤ |V |. For
each assignment pi, we can find the maximum value of∑
i∈NV
2vi(pi) by finding the maximum weight matching of
the bipartite graphQ = (V,NV , V ×NV ) with the weight of
an edge (i, a) being vi(a) (inO(n
4)). Since there are n!(n−|U|)!
ways of assigning players to U , an allocation with the optimal
potential value can be computed in O(nmin(|U|,|V |)+4).
Corollary 3. For the symmetric graphical matching problem,
if the underlying item graph is a complete bipartite graph
with a constant number of vertices in one of the partitions, a
2-stable allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
There are various interesting graph structures which satisfy
the above restriction, the simplest being the star graph, which
is independently important in modelling workplaces with flat
hierarchies, such as research labs.
4 Stability in Asymmetric Neighbourhood
When the underlying player graph is not symmetric, Exam-
ple 2 shows that 2-stable outcomes need not always exists.
The negative result already holds for the allocation problem
with uniform valuation where the underlying player graph
is a cycle and the item graphs consists of two disconnected
cliques. This raises the question: What is the complexity of
deciding if an instance of the graphical matching problem has
a 2-stable outcome? We show that in general, this problem is
NP-complete. We then identify restrictions where stable out-
comes always exist and can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 6. The problem of deciding if an instance of the
graphical matching problem has a 2-stable allocation is NP-
complete.
Proof sketch. Given an allocation pi, deciding whether pi is a
2-stable allocation can be done in polynomial time. It suf-
fices to check if there is a blocking pair in pi. Thus the
above problem is in NP. To show hardness, we give a re-
duction from 3-SAT. Let the 3-SAT instance have q vari-
ables ({a1, a2, . . . , aq}) and m clauses ({c1, c2, . . . , cm}).
C1,i C2,i
C3,i C4,i
d
d
d− e
d− e
−2d −2d
d− e
d
d− e
d
Figure 2: A gadget
p ∈ S1 ∪ S2 p ∈ C1 p ∈ C2 p ∈ C3 p ∈ C4
t ∈ AS1 b 0 0 0 0
t ∈ AS2 b 0 0 0 0
t ∈ AC1 0 b+ 4e− f b − 6d b b− 6d
t ∈ AC2 0 b− 6d b b− 6d b− f
t ∈ AC3 0 b− f b − 6d b b− 6d
t ∈ AC4 0 b− 6d b − f b− 6d b
We create an instance of the graphical matching problemwith
|N | = 4m + 2q, with the players being differentiated into
6 types with N = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4 ∪ S1 ∪ S2, where
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} |Ci| = m and ∀j ∈ {1, 2} |Sj | = q. The
key idea is to set up item valuations and the player neigh-
bourhood structure such that a stable allocation can only ex-
ist if each player is assigned an item from the item set cor-
responding to its type(s) and the 3-SAT instance is satisfi-
able. We set up the following constants to aid our expla-
nation: b = (2q + 3m + 20)d = (2q + 3m + 20)2e =
(2q + 3m + 20)3f with f = 1. There are 4 players corre-
sponding to each clause and 2 players corresponding to each
variable. For each clause ci, the players corresponding to it
(ci,1,ci,2, ci,3 and ci,4) are connected as shown in Figure 2,
withwci,2,ci,1 = wci,4,ci,3 = d−e,wci,1,ci,2 = wci,3,ci,4 = d,
wci,4,ci,1 = wci,2,ci,3 = d, wci,1,ci,4 = wci,3,ci,2 = d − e
and wci,3,ci,1 = wci,1,ci,3 = wci,2,ci,4 = wci,4,ci,2 = −2d.
For each variable aj , there are two players sj,1 and sj,2 cor-
responding to the positive literal aj and the negative literal
¬aj respectively. The edge connecting these two players has
a large negative weight (wsj,1,sj,2 = wsj,2,sj,1 = −d). For
each clause ci where a positive literal aj appears x times
and the corresponding negative literal ¬aj appears y times,
wsj,1,ci,1 = (x − y)e and wsj,2,ci,1 = (y − x)e. For ex-
ample, suppose ci = at ∨ ¬au ∨ av . (t 6= u 6= v) Then,
wst,1,ci,1 = wsu,2,ci,1 = wsv,1,ci,1 = e and wst,2,ci,1 =
wsu,1,ci,1 = wsv,2,ci,1 = −e.
The item graph isA = AC1∪AC2∪AC3∪AC4∪AS1∪AS2 ,
with |ACi | = m and |ASj | = q, with each of these six sub-
sets being cliques. Additionally, there is complete connection
between AS2 and AC1 , AC1 and AC2 and AC3 and AC4 . The
table above contains vp(t), for each player p and item t.
Thus, deciding the existence of a 2-stable allocation in an
instance of the graphical matching problem is NP-complete.
It is natural to try to identify restricted classes in which sta-
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Figure 3: An item graph and an allocation
ble allocations are guaranteed to exist and classes where such
allocations can be computed efficiently. A natural restric-
tion to consider is a hierarchical influence structure, which
is present in several organizations. In our framework, such a
structure can be modelled by restricting the player graph to
a directed acyclic graph (DAG). We now show that when the
player graph is a DAG, a core stable allocation is guaranteed
to exist and such an allocation can be computed in polynomial
time.
Theorem 7. Consider an instanceM of the graphical match-
ing problem where the underlying player graph G is a DAG.
A core stable allocation is guaranteed to exist in M and it
can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 8. Consider an instance M = (G,H, (vi)i∈N ) of
the graphical matching problemwith uniform valuation. IfM
satisfies the following conditions, then a 2-stable allocation
always exists and it can be computed in polynomial time.
• G is a cycle and ∃i, j ∈ N such that (j, i) ∈ τ and
wj,i > 0.
• there exists a ∈ A such that for all a′ ∈ A − {a},
(a, a′) ∈ λ.
Theorem 9. Consider an instance M = (G,H, (vi)i∈N ) of
the graphical matching problem with uniform valuation. If G
is a cycle with positive connection weights w and H is con-
nected and has at least 1 node with degree 1, then a core sta-
ble allocation always exists and it can be computed in poly-
nomial time.
Note that it is not the case that every 2-stable allocation
is also a core stable allocation in this restricted setting (as
specified in Theorem 9). Consider an instance of the graph-
ical matching problem with uniform valuation where N =
{1, . . . , 6} forms a cycle and the item graph is as shown in
Figure 3. The numbers labelling the nodes of the item graph
denote the players to which the items are assigned. Con-
sider the allocation pi where pi(i) = Ai for i ∈ {2, 4, 6} and
pii = Bi for i ∈ {1, 3, 5} (also labelled in Figure 3). It can
be verified that pi is 2-stable but not core stable due to the
existence of the blocking coalition X = {1, 3, 5}. In fact,
at pi there is a unique blocking coalition given by X . The
resolution of the blocking coalition generates an allocation
pi′ where pi′(1) = B5, pi
′(3) = B3 and pi
′(5) = B5. Now
X ′ = {2, 4, 6} forms a blocking coalition in pi′. It can also
be verified that starting at pi there is a unique sequence of im-
provement steps resolving blocking coalitions which results
in an infinite coalition improvement path.
5 Envy-Freeness
Envy-freeness is a natural and well-studied notion of fairness
in resource allocation. In the cake-cutting problem, the ex-
istence of a complete, envy-free allocation is guaranteed for
all agent valuations [Alon, 1987]. In the indivisible goods
setting, we have hardness results [Bouveret and Lang, 2008]
for computing the existence of a complete, envy-free allo-
cation (Note: An allocation is complete if all of the item(s)
available has (have) been assigned to the players). Re-
cent works on resource allocation with a graphical com-
ponent ([Chevaleyre et al., 2017], [Bouveret et al., 2017],
[Abebe et al., 2017] and [Beynier et al., 2018]) have exam-
ined envy-freeness and its variants in great detail. Typically,
the notion of envy is defined with respect to a bundle of
items possessed by some other player. In our model, since a
player’s utility is dependent on other players’ allocations, we
adopt a slightly modified notion of envy-freeness, which is
defined as follows. An allocation pi is envy-free if there does
not exist i, j such that ui(pi) < ui(pi
′) where pi′(i) = pi(j),
pi′(j) = pi(i) and for all k ∈ N − {i, j}, pi(k) = pi′(k).
The above notion is very similar to the notion of swap envy-
freeness defined in [Branzei et al., 2013]. Note that, in a
graphical matching problem, every allocation is complete by
definition. A natural question is to ask whether it is possi-
ble to decide the existence of an envy-free allocation given
an instance of the graphical matching problem. We show that
even for a graphical matching problem with uniform valua-
tion, where the underlying player graph is a cycle, this prob-
lem is NP-complete.
Theorem 10. For an instance of the graphical matching
problem with uniform valuation where the underlying player
graph is an unweighted cycle, deciding if there exists an envy-
free allocation is NP-complete.
It is not difficult to show that deciding the existence of
a complete, envy-free allocation in an instance of the sym-
metric graphical matching problem is NP-complete. Note
that, deciding the existence of a complete, envy-free assign-
ment in an allocation problem is known to be NP-complete
[Bouveret and Lang, 2008].
6 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the problem of allocating indivisi-
ble items to a set of players where agents have cardinal non-
transferable utilities associated with each allocation. We ex-
tended the one-sided market model to the network setting
where agents’ utilities depend on their neighbourhood ex-
ternalities that are item specific and pairwise separable. We
show that unlike in the case of one-sided markets, 2-stable al-
locations may not always exist. When the underlying neigh-
bourhood structure is symmetric, a 2-stable allocation is guar-
anteed to exist although computing such an allocation is PLS-
complete (already for player graphs of degree 6). We provide
a polynomial time procedure to compute a 2-stable allocation
when the degree of the player graph is bounded by two. An
interesting question is to see if this result can be extended
to player graphs of degree three using the technique of lo-
cal linear programs as done for the local max-cut problem
[Poljak, 1995]. Another natural question is the existence of
core stable outcomes. While we believe that a core-stable
allocation always exists in the symmetric setting, so far, we
have been unable to prove this result. In case a core-stable
outcome is not guaranteed to exist, it would be useful to find
the maximum value of c such that c-stable outcomes exist.
There are several ways to extend the model. Allocations
that allow subsets of items to be assigned to players is an ob-
vious choice. We could also consider externalities which are
not necessarily pairwise separable. It would be interesting to
see whether the existence results continue to hold in these ex-
tended settings. It would also be interesting to identify more
general classes of neighbourhood structures in which stable
allocations are guaranteed to exist and where such an alloca-
tion can be efficiently computed.
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Appendix
Example 2. Let the set of players N = {1, . . . , 6} and A =
{A,B,C,D,E, F}. Suppose the player graph G = (N, τ)
forms a cycle on N consisting of the edges (6, 1) ∈ τ and
(i, i + 1) ∈ τ for all i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. For every edge
(i, j) ∈ τ , let wi,j = c for some constant c. We also as-
sume uniform valuation vi(a) = 0 for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A.
Let the item graph be the structure given in Figure 1. Since
the item graph consists of two 3-cliques, it is sufficient to
divide players into groups of 3, assign them to any of the
3-cliques, and check if, for any group of 3, we have a 2-
stable allocation. Below we provide the list of all such allo-
cations and underline the blocking pair: ((1, 2, 3), (4, 5, 6)),
((1, 2, 4), (3, 5, 6)), ((1, 2, 5), (3, 4, 6)), ((1, 2, 6), (3, 4, 5)),
((1, 3, 4), (2, 5, 6)), ((1, 3, 5), (2, 4, 6)), ((1, 3, 6), (2, 4, 5)),
((1, 4, 5), (2, 3, 6)), ((1, 4, 6), (2, 3, 5)), ((1, 5, 6), (2, 3, 4)).
Theorem 1. Every improvement path in a symmetric graph-
ical matching problem is finite. Thus, a 2-stable allocation
always exists.
Proof. We can argue that the following function acts as a po-
tential function in the symmetric graphical matching prob-
lem: φ(pi) =
∑
i∈N (vi(pi) + ui(pi)).
Consider an arbitrary allocation pi which is not 2-stable and
let pi →p1,p2 pi
′. By the definition of a blocking pair, for
i ∈ {1, 2}, vpi(pi
′) + rpi(pi
′) > vpi(pi) + rpi(pi). Therefore,
we have φ(pi′)−φ(pi) =
∑
p∈N (up(pi
′)+vp(pi
′)− (up(pi)+
vp(pi))) =
∑
i∈{1,2}((vpi(pi
′) − vpi(pi)) + 2(rpi(pi
′) −
rpi(pi))) + (vpi(pi
′) − vpi(pi)) = 2
∑
i∈{1,2}(vpi(pi
′) +
rpi(pi
′))− (vpi(pi) + rpi(pi)) > 0
Theorem 2. Finding a 2-stable allocation in a symmetric
graphical matching problem with uniform valuation in which
the edge weights in the underlying player graph are non-
negative is PLS-complete.
Proof. Consider an instance of the graphical matching prob-
lem with uniform valuation. Without loss of generality we
assume that vi(a) = 0 for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A. In this
case, the potential function defined in the proof of Theo-
rem 1 essentially reduces to the social welfare, i.e., φ(pi) =
Σi∈Nui(pi) = SW (pi). Note that, an arbitrary allocation can
be computed in polynomial time. Given an arbitrary allo-
cation pi, we can compute the social welfare φ(pi) in poly-
nomial time. We can also check if pi is 2-stable in polyno-
mial time. Thus, the problem of finding a 2-stable allocation
is in PLS. To show PLS-hardness, we give a tight reduction
from the PLS-complete max-cut problem with FLIP neigh-
bourhood [Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991].
Let Q = (V,E, {ze}e∈E) be an instance of the max-cut
problem where V is the set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is the
set of edges and {ze}e∈E is the set of non-negative edge
weights. We construct an instance of the symmetric graphical
matching problem in which the underlying player graph has
non-negative edge weights as follows. Let the player graph
G = (N, τ), where N = {vblue | v ∈ V } ∪ {vred | v ∈ V }.
That is, for every vertex v ∈ V , there are two vertices
vblue and vred in N . Thus |N | = 2 ∗ |V |. For each edge
(u, v) ∈ E we add two edges in τ : (ublue , vblue) ∈ τ
and (ured , vred) ∈ τ with wublue ,vblue = wured ,vred = z(u,v).
Let wmax = |N |2 ∗ (maxe∈E ze − mine∈E ze). For ev-
ery vertex v ∈ V , we also add the edge (vblue , vred) ∈ τ
with wvblue ,vred = wmax . The item graph is the complete
bipartite graph H = (A, λ) where each partition consists
of |V | vertices. In other words, let the two partitions be
A1 and A2, with vertices A1(1), A1(2), . . . , A1(|V |) and
A2(1), A2(2), . . . , A2(|V |)). By assumption, for all i ∈ N
and a ∈ A, vi(a) = 0.
Consider any allocation pi which is a local optimum in
an instance of the graphical matching problem constructed
above. We argue that it satisfies the following condition:
For every pair of players (vblue , vred), the items allocated to
these players under pi will not be in the same partition. Sup-
pose not, assume that there exists some local optimum such
that there exists nodes ublue and ured such that pi(ublue) and
pi(ured) are in the same partition. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that both the items are in partition A1. Then
there must exist some v such that vblue and vred both possess
items in A2. But, (vblue , ublue), (vblue , ured), (vred , ured)
and (vred , ublue) all form blocking pairs in this case. This
gives us a contradiction to the optimality of pi.
By the definition of a tight reduction
([Christopoulos and Zissimopoulos, 2004], Definition
5.2), we need to be able to find a subset S of allocations
which satisfies the conditions below:
• S contains all 2-stable allocations of this instance of the
graphical matching problem.
• For every cut (V1, V1), it should be possible to construct,
in polynomial time, an allocation pi ∈ S such that pi
maps to (V1, V1).
• For any pair of allocations pi1, pit ∈ S such that there is
an improvement path pi1, pi2, . . . , pit−1, pit with the allo-
cations pi2, . . . , pit−1 /∈ S, the cuts (V1, V1) and (Vt, Vt)
(corresponding to the allocations pi1 and pit respectively)
must either be the same or there must be an improvement
step from (V1, V1) to (Vt, Vt).
We argue that the following set of allocations satisfies these
conditions: S = {pi|∄v ∈ V, pi(vblue) ∈ Ai and pi(vred ) ∈
Ai∀i ∈ {1, 2}}.
By the necessary condition for local optima established
above, all local optima must belong to S. Note that, we
can construct an allocation corresponding to any cut as fol-
lows: Let (V1, V1) be an arbitrary cut. pi is an allocation
corresponding to (V1, V1) if ∀v ∈ V1, pi(vblue) ∈ A1 and
∀v ∈ V1, pi(vblue) ∈ A2. Note that, the social welfare
SW (pi) = 4 ∗ cutWeight(V1, V1) + 2|V | ∗ wmax. Such an
allocation can clearly be constructed in polynomial time.
Note that there can be no directed edges from pi ∈ S to
pi′ ∈ Π−S in the transition graph of an instance of graphical
matching problem (since SW (pi′) < 2|V | ∗ wmax). Thus,
the third condition for a tight reduction is trivially satisfied,
which completes our proof.
The standard local search algorithm starts from an ini-
tial feasible solution and moves to better neighbours until it
reaches a local optimum. In the case of the graphical match-
ing problem, this implies starting with an initial allocation
and successively performing blocking pair resolutions until
we reach a local optimum. We show that, for the graphical
matching problem, the standard local search algorithm takes
exponential time in the worst case, irrespective of the block-
ing pair selection rule used.
Corollary 2. The standard local search algorithm takes ex-
ponential time in the worst case for the symmetric graphical
matching problem.
Proof. Note that, by theorem 5.15 of
[Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991], the standard local search
algorithm takes exponential time in the worst case for the
max-cut problem. Since we have a tight reduction from the
max-cut problem to the graphical matching problem, by
lemma 3.3 of [Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991], the standard
local search algorithm takes exponential time in the worst
case for the graphical matching problem.
Theorem 3. For the symmetric graphical matching problem
with uniform valuation, if the underlying player graph has
vertices of degree at most two, a 2-stable allocation can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that vi(a) = 0 for
all i ∈ N and a ∈ A. Since all the vertices of the underlying
player graphG have degree at most 2, for all i ∈ N , |iτ | ≤ 2.
Let n = |N |. In order to fix notation, let us assume that
iτ = {il, ir} if |iτ | = 2 and iτ = {il} if |iτ | = 1. Let
ci,1 = maxj∈iτ |wj,i| with ci,2 = minj∈iτ |wj,i| if |iτ | = 2
and ci,2 = 0 otherwise.
Let g : N → N denote an ordering of the players
(where g(i) denotes the rank of i ∈ N in this ordering)
which satisfies the following condition: if g(i) < g(j) then
ci,1 ≥ cj,1. For i ∈ N , let umini = minpi∈Π ui(pi) and
Yi = {u
min
i , u
min
i + ci,2, u
min
i + ci,1, u
min
i + ci,1 + ci,2}.
Note that, for all pi ∈ Π, ui(pi) ∈ Yi. For x ∈ Yi, let
fi(x) =


0 if x = umini
1 if x = umini + ci,2(ci,2 ≤ ci,1)
2 if x = umini + ci,1 and ci,1 > ci,2
3 if x = umini + ci,1 + ci,2 and ci,2 > 0
Let σi(pi) = (2n − g(i))fi(ui(pi)) and P : Π → Z≥0
be defined as: P (pi) =
∑
i∈N σi(pi). Note that for any
pi ∈ Π, P (pi) is at most 6n2. Let (pi, pi′) be any block-
ing pair resolution involving players (i, j). We now ar-
gue that P (pi′) > P (pi). Note that, P (pi′) − P (pi) =∑
p∈iτ∪jτ∪{i,j}
(σp(pi
′)− σp(pi)).
To simplify our proof, we assume edge weights to be non-
negative. The cases where some edge weights are negative
follow similarly. We have the following cases:
• ∄p ∈ iτ , q ∈ jτ such that p = q: In this case, we can
treat the swap as independent moves. Thus, it is suffi-
cient to analyze the changes due to a single player. In
the following cases, we show that
∑
p∈iτ∪{i}
(σp(pi
′) −
σp(pi)) > 0.
– Case 1: il /∈ N(i, pi) and ir /∈ N(i, pi). By
the definition of the blocking pair resolution, either
il ∈ N(i, pi′) or ir ∈ N(i, pi′). (Note that, if i’s
degree is 1, il ∈ N(i, pi′) must hold.)
– Case 2: Without loss of generality, il ∈ N(i, pi),
ir /∈ N(i, pi) and il, ir ∈ N(i, pi′). Note that this
case can only be applicable for players with de-
gree 2. It can be verified that in both these cases,∑
p∈iτ∪{i}
(σp(pi
′)− σp(pi)) > 0
– Case 3: Without loss of generality, il ∈ N(i, pi),
ir /∈ N(i, pi) and il /∈ N(i, pi′), ir ∈ N(i, pi′),
implying ui(pi) = ci,2 = wil,i and ui(pi
′) =
ci,1 = wir ,i. Note that, ∀p ∈ {i, ir} fp(up(pi
′)) −
fp(up(pi)) ≥ 1 while fil(uil(pi
′)) − fil(uil(pi)) ∈
{−1,−2}. Note that this case can only be applica-
ble for players with degree 2.
∗ If fil(uil(pi
′)) − fil(uil(pi)) = −1, then∑
p∈iτ∪{i}
(σp(pi
′) − σp(pi)) ≥ (2n − g(ir)) +
(2n− g(i))− (2n− g(il)) > 0 as 1 ≤ g(k) ≤ n
∀k ∈ N .
∗ If fil(uil(pi
′)) − fil(uil(pi)) = −2, it implies
cil,1 = wi,il . By the definition of the block-
ing pair resolution, ci,1 > cil,1. Since wi,ir >
cil,1, we have cir ,1 > cil,1. By definition of
g, g(il) > g(ir) and g(il) > g(i). Therefore,
∑
p∈iτ∪{i}
(σp(pi
′) − σp(pi)) ≥ (2n − g(ir)) +
(2n− g(i))− 2(2n− g(il)) = 2g(il)− (g(ir)+
g(i)) > 0.
• ∃p ∈ iτ , q ∈ jτ such that p = q. Without loss of gener-
ality, let il = jl and ir 6= jr (if ir, jr exist):
– Case 4: ir /∈ N(i, pi) and il /∈ N(i, pi). If
ir ∈ N(i, pi′) and il /∈ N(i, pi′), this is the same
as Case 1. If il ∈ N(i, pi
′), il ∈ N(j, pi) and
il /∈ N(j, pi′). By the definition of the blocking pair
resolution, jr ∈ N(j, pi′) and jr /∈ N(j, pi). There-
fore, ∀p ∈ {i, j, jr} fp(up(pi
′)) − fp(up(pi)) ≥ 1
while fil(uil(pi
′)) − fil(uil(pi)) ≥ −1. Thus,
P (pi′)− P (pi) > 0.
– Case 5: ir /∈ N(i, pi) and il ∈ N(i, pi), with
ir ∈ N(i, pi′) and il ∈ N(i, pi′): Therefore, il ∈
N(j, pi). By the definition of the blocking pair res-
olution, jr ∈ N(j, pi′) and jr /∈ N(j, pi). There-
fore, ∀p ∈ {i, j, ir, jr} fp(up(pi′)) − fp(up(pi)) ≥
1 while fil(uil(pi
′)) − fil(uil(pi)) ≥ 0. Thus,
P (pi′)− P (pi) > 0.
• iτ = jτ with |iτ | = 2. In this case, it is easy to verify
that a blocking pair is only possible if both i, j are con-
nected to one item initially. Let pi →i,j pi′. Therefore,
for all p ∈ {i, j, il, ir}(up(pi′) − up(pi)) > 0 implying
fp(up(pi
′)) − fp(up(pi)) > 0 ∀p ∈ {i, j, il, ir}. Thus,
P (pi′)− P (pi) > 0.
Theorem 5. For the symmetric graphical matching problem,
if the underlying item graph is a complete bipartite graph
H = (U, V, U × V ) with U and V being the 2 partitions, a
2-stable allocation can be computed in O(nmin(|U|,|V |)+4).
Proof. For a symmetric graphical matching problem, the po-
tential function is given by φ(pi) =
∑
i∈N (vi(pi) + ui(pi))
(Theorem 1). Let NU = {i|pi(i) ∈ U} and NV = {i|pi(i) ∈
V }. Note that, for a bipartite graph, this can be written as
φ(pi) =
∑
i∈NU
(vi(pi) + ui(pi)) +
∑
i∈NV
(vi(pi) + ui(pi))
=
∑
i∈NU
(2vi(pi) + ri(pi)) +
∑
i∈NV
(2vi(pi) + ri(pi))
=
∑
i∈NU
(2vi(pi) + 2ri(pi)) +
∑
i∈NV
2vi(pi)
=
∑
i∈NU
2ui(pi) +
∑
i∈NV
2vi(pi)
=
∑
i∈NU
2vi(pi) +
∑
i∈NV
2ui(pi).
Without loss of generality, let |U | ≤ |V |. For each assign-
ment pi, we can find the maximum value of
∑
i∈NV
2vi(pi) by
finding the maximum weight matching of the bipartite graph
Q = (V,NV , V ×NV ) with the weight of an edge (i, a) be-
ing vi(a) (in O(n
4)). Note that there are n!(n−|U|)! ways of
assigning the |U | items to players in N . For each of these,∑
i∈NU
2ui(pi) is fixed sinceH is a complete bipartite graph,
and the maximum value of
∑
i∈NV
2vi(pi) can be computed
by reducing it to a maximumweight matching problem as de-
scribed above. Thus, an allocation with the optimal potential
value can be computed in O(nmin(|U|,|V |)+4).
Theorem 6. The problem of deciding if an instance of the
graphical matching problem has a 2-stable allocation is NP-
complete.
p ∈ S1 ∪ S2 p ∈ C1 p ∈ C2 p ∈ C3 p ∈ C4
t ∈ AS1 b 0 0 0 0
t ∈ AS2 b 0 0 0 0
t ∈ AC1 0 b+ 4e− f b − 6d b b− 6d
t ∈ AC2 0 b− 6d b b− 6d b− f
t ∈ AC3 0 b− f b − 6d b b− 6d
t ∈ AC4 0 b− 6d b − f b− 6d b
Proof. Given an allocation pi, deciding whether pi is a 2-
stable allocation can be done in polynomial time. It suf-
fices to check if there is a blocking pair in pi. Thus the
above problem is in NP. To show hardness, we give a re-
duction from 3-SAT. Let the 3-SAT instance have q vari-
ables ({a1, a2, . . . , aq}) and m clauses ({c1, c2, . . . , cm}).
We create an instance of the graphical matching problemwith
|N | = 4m + 2q, with the players being differentiated into
6 types with N = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4 ∪ S1 ∪ S2, where
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} |Ci| = m and ∀j ∈ {1, 2} |Sj | = q. The
key idea is to set up item valuations and the player neigh-
bourhood structure such that a stable allocation can only ex-
ist if each player is assigned an item from the item set cor-
responding to its type(s) and the 3-SAT instance is satisfi-
able. We set up the following constants to aid our expla-
nation: b = (2q + 3m + 20)d = (2q + 3m + 20)2e =
(2q + 3m + 20)3f with f = 1. There are 4 players corre-
sponding to each clause and 2 players corresponding to each
variable. For each clause ci, the players corresponding to it
(ci,1,ci,2, ci,3 and ci,4) are connected as shown in Figure 2,
withwci,2,ci,1 = wci,4,ci,3 = d−e,wci,1,ci,2 = wci,3,ci,4 = d,
wci,4,ci,1 = wci,2,ci,3 = d, wci,1,ci,4 = wci,3,ci,2 = d − e
and wci,3,ci,1 = wci,1,ci,3 = wci,2,ci,4 = wci,4,ci,2 = −2d.
For each variable aj , there are two players sj,1 and sj,2 cor-
responding to the positive literal aj and the negative literal
¬aj respectively. The edge connecting these two players has
a large negative weight (wsj,1,sj,2 = wsj,2,sj,1 = −d). For
each clause ci where a positive literal aj appears x times
and the corresponding negative literal ¬aj appears y times,
wsj,1,ci,1 = (x − y)e and wsj,2,ci,1 = (y − x)e. For ex-
ample, suppose ci = at ∨ ¬au ∨ av . (t 6= u 6= v) Then,
wst,1,ci,1 = wsu,2,ci,1 = wsv,1,ci,1 = e and wst,2,ci,1 =
wsu,1,ci,1 = wsv,2,ci,1 = −e.
The item graph isA = AC1∪AC2∪AC3∪AC4∪AS1∪AS2 ,
with |ACi | = m and |ASj | = q, with each of these six sub-
sets being cliques. Additionally, there is complete connection
between AS2 and AC1 , AC1 and AC2 and AC3 and AC4 . The
table above contains vp(t), for each player p and item t.
Let us assume that the 3-SAT instance has some satisfy-
ing assignment. We can construct a 2-stable allocation using
this satisfying assignment. Let T denote the set of variables
which are set to true in this satisfying assignment, and F de-
note the set of variables set to false in this assignment. It
is easy to verify that the following allocation pi is 2-stable:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} ∀j ∈ Ci pi(j) ∈ ACi , ∀aj ∈ T pi(sj,1) ∈
AS2 and pi(sj,2) ∈ AS1 and ∀aj ∈ F pi(sj,2) ∈ AS2 and
pi(sj,1) ∈ AS1 . Note that, all players in S1 ∪ S2 ∪ C2 ∪ C4
have the maximum utility attainable, and hence, cannot be a
part of any blocking pair. Thus, the only possible blocking
pair is between players i, j ∈ C1 ∪ C3. Since any two play-
ers x, y ∈ Ci are connected to the same set of players, and
their valuations for all items in ACi are the same, they can-
not form a blocking pair. Thus, the only possible blocking
pair is between players x, y where, without loss of general-
ity, x ∈ C1 and y ∈ C3. Since the assignment is satisfying,
vx(pi(x)) ≥ b+ d+ e− f > b+ d ≥ vx(pi(y)). Hence, this
is a 2-stable allocation.
To complete the proof, we simply need to show that every
2-stable allocation will generate a satisfying assignment for
the 3-SAT instance. We first list necessary conditions for a
2-stable allocation.
Claim 1. For every 2-stable allocation pi, it is necessary that:
• For all p ∈ S1 ∪ S2, pi(p) ∈ AS1 ∪ AS2
• For all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, for all p ∈ Ci, pi(p) ∈ ACi .
• There does not exist i s.t. pi(si,1) ∈ Sk and pi(si,2) ∈ Sk
for some k ∈ {1, 2}.
The proof of the claim follows from the lemmas given be-
low:
Lemma 1. For any 2-stable allocation pi, ∀x ∈ S1 ∪ S2,
pi(x) ∈ AS1 ∪ AS2 and, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} ∀y ∈ Ci pi(y) ∈
AC1 ∪ AC2 ∪AC3 ∪ AC4 .
Lemma 2. For any 2-stable allocation pi, for each player p ∈
C1∪C3, pi(p) ∈ AC1∪AC3 and for each player q ∈ C2∪C4,
pi(q) ∈ AC2 ∪ AC4 .
Lemma 3. For any 2-stable allocation pi, for each player p ∈
C1, pi(p) ∈ AC1 and, for each player q ∈ C3, pi(q) ∈ AC3 .
Lemma 4. For any 2-stable allocation pi, for each player p ∈
C2, pi(p) ∈ AC2 and, for each player q ∈ C4, pi(q) ∈ AC4 .
Lemma 5. For any 2-stable allocation pi, for each pair of
players si,1 and si,2, if pi(si,1) ∈ ASk , pi(si,2) ∈ AS3−k for
k ∈ {1, 2}.
We can generate an assignment for the 3-SAT instance us-
ing a 2-stable allocation as follows: Let X = {i ∈ S1 ∪ S2 |
pi(i) ∈ AS2}. Since the allocation is 2-stable, assuming
Claim 1, for each variable aj in the 3-SAT instance, exactly
one of sj,1 and sj,2 must be in X . If sj,1 ∈ X , we set aj to
true, otherwise, we set it to false. We will show that this con-
stitutes a satisfying assignment for the 3-SAT instance. Let
Xi = Number of satisfying literals for clause ci in the gener-
ated assignment and Yi = Number of unsatisfying literals for
clause ci in the generated assignment. Suppose there exists
some 2-stable allocation pi. Let us assume, to the contrary,
that the generated assignment does not satisfy the 3-SAT in-
stance. Therefore, there must exist some clause ci which is
not satisfied. However, note that uci,1(pi) = (b+d+3e−f)+
e(Xi−Yi) and uci,3(pi) = b+ d− e, while uci,1(pi
′) = b+ d
and uci,3(pi
′) = b+d−f where pi′(ci,1) = pi(ci,3), pi′(ci,3) =
pi(ci,1) and ∀x ∈ ((S1∪S2∪C1∪C2∪C3∪C4)−{ci,1, ci,3})
pi′(x) = pi(x). But, this implies that ci,1 and ci,3 form a
blocking pair with pi →ci,1,ci,3 pi
′. Thus, pi is not 2-stable,
leading to the contradiction.
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are straightforward. We
give the proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 below.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose there exists some player ci,1 ∈
C1 such that pi(ci,1) ∈ AC3 . By lemma 2, there must exist
some player cj,3 ∈ C3 such that pi(cj,3) ∈ AC1 . There are
two cases:
• ∃i, j such that i = j: There are 3 cases now:
– pi(cj,2) ∈ ACk and pi(cj,4) ∈ ACk for some k ∈
{2, 4}: Since pi is 2-stable, there must be some l
such that pi(cl,2) ∈ AC6−k and pi(cl,4) ∈ AC6−k .
But, in this case, cj,2 and cl,4 will form a blocking
pair with pi →cj,2,cl,4 pi
′ as ucj,2(pi) ≤ b − d <
b − f ≤ ucj,2(pi
′). Similarly, ucl,4(pi) ≤ b − e <
b − f ≤ ucl,4(pi
′). Hence, this is not a 2-stable
allocation.
– pi(cj,2) ∈ AC2 and pi(cj,4) ∈ AC4 : In this case, cj,2
and cj,4 form a blocking pair, with pi →cj,2,cj,4 pi
′
as ucj,2(pi) ≤ b + d − e < b + d − f ≤ ucj,2(pi
′)
and ucj,4(pi) ≤ b+ d− e < b+ d− f ≤ ucj,4(pi
′).
Thus, this is not a 2-stable allocation.
– pi(cj,2) ∈ AC4 and pi(cj,4) ∈ AC2 : In this case, cj,1
and cj,3 form a blocking pair, with pi →cj,1,cj,3 pi
′
as ucj,3(pi)) ≤ b+ d− (e+ f) < b+ d ≤ ucj,3(pi
′)
and ucj,1(pi) ≤ b+d−e < b+d+e−f ≤ ucj,1(pi
′).
Thus, this is not a 2-stable allocation.
• ∄i, j such that i 6= j: In this case, ci,3 and cj,1 form a
blocking pair with pi →ci,3,cj,1 pi
′ as uci,3(pi) ≤ b− (e+
f) < b−f ≤ uci,3(pi
′) and ucj,1(pi) ≤ b−(e+f) < b+
e− f ≤ ucj,1(pi
′). Thus, this is not a 2-stable allocation.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose there exists some player ci,2 ∈
C2 such that pi(ci,2) ∈ AC4 . By lemma 2, there must exist
some cj,4 ∈ C4 such that pi(cj,4) ∈ AC2 . There are two
cases:
• ∃i, j such that i = j: In this case, cj,2 and cj,4 form a
blocking pair, with pi →cj,2,cj,4 pi
′ as ucj,2(pi) ≤ b+d−
(e + f) < b + d ≤ ucj,2(pi
′) and ucj,4(pi) ≤ b + d −
(e + f) < b + d ≤ ucj,4(pi
′). Hence, this allocation is
not 2-stable.
• ∄i, j such that i 6= j: In this case, ci,2 and cj,4 form a
blocking pair with pi →ci,2,cj,4 pi
′ as uci,2(pi) ≤ b−(d+
e + f) < b + d ≤ uci,2(pi
′) and ucj,4(pi) ≤ b − (d +
e + f) < b + d ≤ ucj,4(pi
′). Thus, this is not a 2-stable
allocation.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose, ∃si,1, si,2 such that pi(si,1) ∈
ASk and pi(si,2) ∈ ASk for some k ∈ {1, 2}. Since pi is
2-stable, by lemma 1, ∃sj,1, sj,2 such that pi(sj,1) ∈ AS3−k
and pi(sj,2) ∈ AS3−k . But, sj,1 and si,1 form a blocking pair
with pi →sj,1,si,1 pi
′, as ∀x ∈ {1, 2} usj,x(pi) ≤ b − d < b ≤
usj,x(pi
′).
Theorem 7. Consider an instanceM of the graphical match-
ing problem where the underlying player graph G is a DAG.
A core stable allocation is guaranteed to exist in M and it
can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. To compute the allocation, we first do a topologi-
cal sort of the player graph and assign items in this topo-
logical ordering. For each player, we assign the item from
amongst the unassigned items which maximizes the player’s
net utility. If there are multiple such items, we choose an
arbitrary item. Let pi be a resulting allocation. Suppose pi
is not core stable. Then, there exists a blocking coalition
X with pi′ and µ : X → X such that ∀x ∈ X pi′(x) 6=
pi(x), pi′(x) = pi(µ(x)) and ux(pi
′(x)) > ux(pi(x)). Let y
be the first player fromX in the topological ordering. There-
fore, uy(pi
′(y)) > uy(pi(y)). Note that, since G is a DAG,
the utility of y depends only on the items allocated to play-
ers before y in the topological order. But, since y is the first
player in X to be allocated an item, both pi′(y) and pi(y) are
available at the time y is allocated an item. Since y chooses
the item which maximizes its utility, uy(pi
′(y)) > uy(pi(y))
is a contradiction.
Theorem 8. Consider an instance M = (G,H, (vi)i∈N ) of
the graphical matching problemwith uniform valuation. IfM
satisfies the following conditions, then a 2-stable allocation
always exists and it can be computed in polynomial time.
• G is a cycle and ∃i, j ∈ N such that (j, i) ∈ τ and
wj,i > 0.
• there exists a ∈ A such that for all a′ ∈ A − {a},
(a, a′) ∈ λ.
Proof. Let the players in the cycle, in order, be numbered
from 1 to n, and wj−1,j = cj ∀j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n} and wn,1 =
c1. Without loss of generality, let the first player be one with
a non-negative neighbourhood valuation. That is, wn,1 = c1,
c1 > 0. We assign the first player an item connected to all
of the remaining items. We assign the remaining items in the
order {2, 3, . . . , n}. For each player, we assign the item from
amongst the unassigned items which maximizes the player’s
net utility. If there are multiple such items, we choose an
arbitrary item. Let pi be a resulting allocation. Suppose, pi is
not 2-stable. Therefore, ∃x, y such that pi →x,y pi
′. Without
loss of generality, let x be the player assigned an item first.
There are two cases:
• x = 1: Since the item valuations are uniform, the only
difference in utility is because of the neighbourhood
structure. Since a = pi(1) is connected to each of the
items and wn,1 > 0, u1(pi
′(1)) ≤ u1(pi(1)). Hence,
there is a contradiction.
• x 6= 1: Since player x− 1 has already been allocated an
item, the utility of x is fixed on choosing an item. Since
(x, y) is a blocking pair, ux(pi
′(x)) > ux(pi(x)). But,
when x is allocated an item, both pi(x) and pi′(x) are
available. Since x chooses the item which maximizes its
utility, ux(pi
′(x)) > ux(pi(x)) is a contradiction.
Theorem 9. Consider an instance M = (G,H, (vi)i∈N ) of
the graphical matching problem with uniform valuation. If G
is a cycle with positive connection weights w and H is con-
nected and has at least 1 node with degree 1, then a core sta-
ble allocation always exists and it can be computed in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. Let the players in the cycle, in order, be numbered
from 1 to n. We assign the first player an item with de-
gree at most 1. We assign the remaining items in the or-
der {2, 3, . . . , n}. For each player, we assign the item from
amongst the unassigned items which maximizes the player’s
utility. If there are multiple such items, we choose an arbi-
trary item. Let pi be a resulting allocation. Suppose pi is not
core stable. Then, there exists a blocking coalitionX with pi′
and µ : X → X such that ∀x ∈ X pi′(x) 6= pi(x), pi′(x) =
pi(µ(x)) and ux(pi
′(x)) > ux(pi(x)). Let y be the first player
from X in the ordering. Therefore, uy(pi
′(y)) > uy(pi(y)).
There are two cases:
• y = 1: Since the item valuations are uniform, the
only difference in utility is because of the neighbour-
hood structure. Since a = pi(1) has degree one, it must
be connected to a single item. Since player two is the
next player to be allocated an item, and all connection
weights are positive, the item connected to pi(1) (say
b) must be allocated to player two. Additionally, since
the graph is connected, pi(2)(= b) must be connected to
at least one node other than pi(1) (say c). Since player
three is the next player to be allocated an item, it must
be allocated an item c. Since players two and three have
their maximum possible utility under pi, and pi(1) is con-
nected only to pi(2), there can be no player x such that
µ(x) = 1, and ux(pi(1)) > ux(pi(x)). Hence, there is a
contradiction.
• y 6= 1: Since player y − 1 has already been allocated
an item, the utility of y is fixed on choosing an item.
But, since y is the first player in X to be allocated an
item, both pi′(y) and pi(y) are available at the time y is
allocated an item. Since y chooses the item which max-
imizes its utility, uy(pi
′(y)) > uy(pi(y)) is a contradic-
tion.
Theorem 10. For an instance of the graphical matching
problem with uniform valuation where the underlying player
graph is an unweighted cycle, deciding if there exists an envy-
free allocation is NP-complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that the problem is in NP. We show
NP-hardness by giving a reduction from the Hamiltonian cy-
cle problem. Consider an instance of the Hamiltonian cycle
problem given by the connected graph Q = (T,E). We con-
struct an instance of the graphical matching problem as fol-
lows: the item graphH = (A, λ) is the graph Q. The player
graph is a directed cycleG = (N, τ, w) where |N | = |T | and
for i ∈ N , iτ = {i− 1}where n+1 = 1 and 1− 1 = n. The
player graph is unweighted, i.e. for all (i, j) ∈ τ , wi,j = 1.
We set vi(a) = 0 for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A.
If there exists a Hamiltonian cycle in Q, we can construct
an envy-free allocation as follows. We allocate items to the
players from 1 to n in the order given by the Hamiltonian
cycle. We now argue that the existence of an envy-free al-
location implies the existence of a Hamiltonian cycle in Q.
It suffices to show that, in an envy-free allocation pi, for all
i ∈ N , (i − 1) ∈ di(pi) (recall that 1 − 1 = n). If each
player is connected to their preceding player in the allocation
pi, we can simply start from the item allocated to player n,
and construct the cycle by adding the edge to the allocation
of the preceding player. Let us assume, to the contrary, that
there exists some envy-free allocation pi such that, for some
i ∈ N , i − 1 6∈ di(pi). Since the item graph is connected,
there must exist some j ∈ N such that i − 1 ∈ dj(pi). Thus,
ui(pi) < ui(pi
′) where pi′(i) = pi(j), pi′(j) = pi(i) and for all
k ∈ N − {i, j}, pi(k) = pi′(k). Hence, pi is not an envy-free
allocation which is a contradiction.
